Strategic Depth

How to define Strategic depth- the space a combatant can exploit beyond its core territories or the internal distance within a state from the frontline to its centre of gravity or Heartland, its core population areas or important cities or industrial installations.

For Russia, Caspian Sea could be about strategic depth as its launched long-range Kalibr cruise missiles from the sea to targets in Syria (more than 1000 miles away).

After World war II, the Soviet Union created the strategic depth it needed to guard against a western invasion by occupying Poland and the Baltic states. Fast forward to 2017, Sweden and Finland are coming together to create their own strategic depth to counter Russia. The Swedish Air Force could allow Finland to use its bases in case Finland have to withdraw its forces in the face of an invasion by Russia. 

Iran and activities of its proxies is another case of cultivation of strategic depth. The Iranian regime sees Syria and Lebanon as its strategic depth. It is funding a plethora of paramilitary proxies, which have become the primary agents of regional instability in countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

Take Pakistan for example, well-known for its strategic depth play. For Pakistan, Afghanistan represents strategic depth against its enemy number one India. Pakistan thinks it must ensure a friendly government on its western border in the event of a military clash against India to gain space for retreat and reorganization. 

But Afghanistan has no such notion, to Quote former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, "India provides emotional strategic depth to the Afghan people".

In Africa Sudan and Eritrea are cases of strategic depth for Egypt. In the words of Ahmoud Diaa, national security counsellor (Egypt), "Sudan is an important country for Egypt and represents an important strategic depth for Egypt, and we are one nation". Eritrea is important player for security of the Red Sea.

Arab countries, historically a guarantor of strategic depth for Palestinian rejectionist forces while lack of strategic depth is a dominant narrative in Israel. 

Mr Ahmet Davutoglu in his book, “Strategic Depth”, advocates a new policy of rebuilding ties round the former Ottoman empire.

So Geography, no less than History, is equally important for prospects of viable peace.

Case of two Évolués

Wikipedia defines Évolué as a French label used during the colonial era to refer to a native African or Asian who had "evolved" by becoming Europeanised through education or assimilation and had accepted European values and patterns of behavior. Anglicized in case of Indians.

Patricia Crone in "The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran" talks about two Évolués- 1.Non-Arabs like Iranians or Berbers (conquered and ruled by Arabs in seventh and early eighth centuries) and 2. Indians (ruled by British, a proxy for Europeans). She raises  a pertinent question:

 "Why did the Arab and European expansions have such different effects on the conquered peoples? Both provoked nativist revolts, but the frequency seems to have been greater on the European than the Muslim side. Also both had to cope with angry évolués, but it was only on the European side that these évolués aimed at secession with reference to their own separate identity.

Non-Arab évolués accepted Islam and the political unity it had brought while évolués of the European empires accepted the secular culture brought by the Europeans, but not the political unity they had established. Why this difference?"

Firstly, Arabs propounded Imamate while Europeans offered Nation State. Nationalism links political organisation with people’s separate identities, emphasizing ethnic or racial differences. On the contrary, the Imamate links political organisation with shared convictions, emphasizing faith that transcends such distinctions, having supranational connotation. For example, Muslim rulers continued to get the certificate, banner and robe of honour from Caliphs which sanctified their rule over infidels unlike British who viewed Indian as a distinct nation; albeit an inferior one.

Secondly, unlike the converts to the secular culture of the Europeans the many who converted to Islam became members of the same political and moral community as the conquerors (ummah). A non-Arab Muslim was not just an évolué but also a citizen. Conversion admitted vanquished natives to the ranks of the imperial elite more or less at will. Say a convert could found a Islamic kingdom and get certificate from Caliph. Say a Bahmani Kingdom and or a Malik Kafur.

As the Author says- "Westernisation did not confer membership of the conquerors’ polity. Nehru may have been the last Englishman to rule India, as he told Galbraith with reference to his thoroughly English culture; but he ruled India precisely because he had participated in the eviction of the British, not because he had received British citizenship or appointment as viceroy of India from them. Westernisation never amounted to membership of the imperial elite."

Évolués like Nehru (or most of the Indian Middle class for that matter) did not belong anywhere; they were politically homeless.