Beyond The Lines – By Kuldip
Nayar is an account of the seventy
year history of India from an honest journalist’s perspective. He had
been a vocal critic of the Congress ever since Indira’s rise and has not been
very kind towards BJP. Many of the views presented are unpalatable to leftist intelligentsia in India.
Here are excerpts from the chapter- THE NEHRU YEARS
The Road to Partition
To the Mission’s surprise, Nehru spoke about a plebiscite in the border districts as if his party had
already accepted the idea of division. Jinnah also mentioned partition, and told a Punjab Hindu
delegation that in his scheme of things Ambala would not form part of Pakistan. Azad, still the
Congress president, was on a different wavelength. He ruled out both Partition and a unitary structure.
His thesis, which Gandhi had approved, was that a federal constitution would give full autonomy to
the provinces and transfer all subjects to them except defence, foreign affairs, and communications.
I believe Patel’s suspicion was that Azad and Nehru were in league and would bypass him. Even
during the Cripps Mission in 1942, he was tormented by similar thoughts. C.P. Ramaswami Iyer, a
distinguished scholar from south India, with whom I briefly worked on a committee on Hindu temples
to ensure their proper administration, told me that Patel ‘interpreted the Cripps Mission as an
organized stunt by Nehru to get himself into the forefront so that he could become the prime minister
of India’.
Azad’s meeting with the Cabinet Mission was discussed threadbare by the Congress Working
Committee (CWC) when it met on 12 April 1946. Members voiced their doubts over the federal
structure. Gandhi came to Azad’s rescue and silenced the critics by saying that a federal solution
alone could work in a country of India’s size and diversities. When Patel said that subjects like
currency and finance should be in the hands of the Centre, Gandhi intervened to say that it would be in
the interest of the provinces to have a unified policy in such matters but it was not necessary to
include such subjects in a compulsory central list.
Jinnah reacted sharply and blamed Nehru for repudiating the grouping of provinces and the limited
Centre, the ‘basic form’ on which the scheme rested. He made the All-India Council of the Muslim
League change its earlier resolution by rejecting the proposal. He accused the Mission of ‘bad faith’
and the Congress of a ‘pettifogging and haggling attitude’. When I met Azad many years later, he held
Nehru responsible for Jinnah’s reversal. In chaste Urdu, Azad said: ‘Woh tala jo kabhi khul nahin
sakta tha Nehru ne uski chabi Jinnah ke hath main de di [Nehru gave to Jinnah the key of the lock
which could not be opened].’
Jinnah gave a call for Direct Action, not against the British but as a show of strength on the part of
Muslims as the Congress had treated their demand with ‘defiance and contempt’. He argued the
Congress was not willing to accept even the proposal conceding only a ‘limited Pakistan’. This was
false propaganda because the Congress had come round to accepting the Cabinet Mission plan, but
after raising doubts that made Jinnah wary. That might have been why, when Mountbatten offered a
partition proposal a year later and asked Jinnah whether he would accept some links with India, he
said: ‘I do not trust them now.’
When asked whether Direct Action would be violent or non-violent, Jinnah said: ‘I am not going to
discuss ethics.’ Direct Action was undertaken only in Calcutta and that too merely for a day (16
August 1946). The Muslim League government in Bengal declared a public holiday on that day,
despite warnings and protests by the Opposition. The League organized a ‘grand rally’ over which
Chief Minister Shaheed Suhrawardy himself presided. Bands of Muslim League National Guards
forced their way into Hindu areas and asked for subscriptions, sometimes as much as Rs 1,000.
Returning from the rally, the League’s National Guards began looting Hindu shops for not paying
subscriptions or not responding to the League’s call for a hartal on that day. Hindus and Sikhs were
attacked and the entire event appeared to have been pre-planned.
Soon Calcutta was engulfed in a communal riot, with Hindus and Sikhs retaliating against Muslims.
Parts of the city were reduced to rubble. Over 5,000 people lost their lives in less than three days in
what came to be known as the ‘great Calcutta killing’, a phrase coined by the Statesman, the
influential British-owned newspaper. Jinnah laid the blame on the Cabinet Mission, the Congress, and
Gandhi. Surprisingly, Jinnah found no fault with his National Guards who had pledged themselves
before the carnage ‘to strive for the achievement of Pakistan and glory of the Muslim nation’. The
Statesman laid the blame on the British governor and Chief Minister Suhrawardy. ‘Arson, looting,
murder, abduction of women, forced conversions and forced marriages are everywhere and by every
investigator spoken of as the characteristics of lawlessness.’
At this juncture Suhrawardy sought Gandhi’s intervention. The latter’s reply was that the future of
Bengal could only be decided by the joint will of the Hindus and Muslims in the state. Shyama Prasad
Mukherjee, a Hindu Mahasabha leader from Bengal, who joined the central cabinet after
Independence, met Gandhi to oppose the whole idea of a sovereign Bengal state. Even then the
Congress and the League in Bengal came to a tentative agreement that if and when a Greater Bengal
came into being, ‘every act of its Government must carry with it the support of at least two-thirds of
the Hindu minority in the executive and the legislature’. This was intended to allay the fears of Hindus
who would be in a minority in a United Bengal.
Punjab, which was also partitioned, saw no similar move to unite the state. One reason was that the
state had neither a Rabindranath Tagore nor a Nazrul Islam to bind the people through poetry, culture,
or language. There was nothing like Punjabi nationalism to string together Hindus, Muslims, and
Sikhs. In comparison, Punjab’s great poet, Iqbal, was himself the author of the idea of Partition. The
Punjabi language, even though spoken by the people as a whole, was written differently by the three
communities: in Arabic (Urdu) script by the Muslims, in Devnagri (Hindi) by the Hindus, and in
Gurmukhi (Punjabi) by the Sikhs. The only culture attributed to Punjab was ‘agriculture’, a
disparaging remark that still is thrown at Punjabis.